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ABSTRACT
Social media users generate tremendous amounts of data. To better
serve users, it is required to share the user-related data among re-
searchers, advertisers and application developers. Publishing such
data would raise more concerns on user privacy. To encourage data
sharing andmitigate user privacy concerns, a number of anonymiza-
tion and de-anonymization algorithms have been developed to help
protect privacy of social media users. In this work, we propose a
new adversarial attack specialized for social media data. We further
provide a principled way to assess effectiveness of anonymizing
different aspects of social media data. Our work sheds light on
new privacy risks in social media data due to innate heterogene-
ity of user-generated data which require striking balance between
sharing user data and protecting user privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Explosive growth of social media in the last decade has drastically
changed the web and billions of people all around the globe can
freely conduct numerous activities such as creating online profiles,
interacting with other people, sharing posts, and various personal
information in a rich heterogeneous environment [3, 4]. The resulted
user-generated social media data consists of different aspects such
as links, posts and profile information. This data provides opportu-
nities for researchers and business partners to study and understand
individuals at unprecedented scales [2, 6, 13].
However, publishing social media network data risks exposing
people’s privacy as the data is rich in content and relationship and
contains individuals’ sensitive and private information, resulting
in privacy leakage [18, 24, 28]. For example, users’ sensitive infor-
mation such as vacation plans and medical conditions can be easily
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inferred from their posts. Publishing complete and intact social
media data could even result in inferring sensitive information the
users do not explicitly disclose such as age and location [7].
Privacy issues of users mandate social media data publishers
to protect users’ privacy by anonymizing the data. One straight-
forward anonymization technique is to remove “Personally Iden-
tifiable Information” (a.k.a. PII) such as names, user ID, age and
location information and keep the social graph structure as is. This
solution has been shown to be far from sufficient to protects peo-
ple’s privacy [2, 24]. An example of this insufficient approach is
the anonymized dataset published for the Netflix prize challenge.
Later, the work of [23] showed that the structure of the data car-
ried enough information for a potential breach of privacy to re-
identify anonymized users. Consequently, various protection tech-
niques have been proposed for anonymizing each aspect of the
heterogeneous social media data. For example, some works per-
form anonymization on graph data structure [10, 20], and others
anonymize users’ location information [27]. In general, the ultimate
goal of an anonymization approach is to preserve social network
user privacy while ensuring the utility of published data.
Existing anonymization techniques often make a specific as-
sumption regarding the way social media data is anonymized. In
particular, these works assume that it’s enough to anonymize each
aspect of heterogeneous social media data (e.g., structure, textual,
and location information) independently. At the first glance, this
assumption makes sense as anonymization takes time and effort.
Moreover, users privacy is protected while the data utility is pre-
served at the highest possible level. For example, lets consider the
simplest case study in which published data includes only two as-
pects such as (i) structural (e.g., friendship, follower/followee links)
and (ii) textual (e.g., posts) information. We will then have options
as shown in Table 1 to anonymize the data: no anonymization for
either aspect, anonymization for one aspect, and anonymization
for both. To ensure anonymization efficiency, as each aspect can
be of different data types, a common practice is to anonymize each
aspect independently. With two aspects as shown in Table 1, case
4 is the backbone of the anonymization techniques for publishing
data which is clearly the strongest protection of privacy.
Privacy advocates have argued that sensitive information could
be still leaked from the dataset anonymized considering each of
these cases, but we lack conclusive evidence. It is unclear how the
latent relation between different aspects of the data could be cap-
tured, whether the sensitive information with the scale of millions
of users could be still leaked and what the success rate of such an
attack could be. In particular, in this research, we are interested to
study these issues by answering the following research questions:
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
00
51
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 M
ay
 20
18
HT ’18, July 9–12, 2018, Baltimore, MD, USA G. Beigi et al.
Table 1: Four different cases for social media data
anonymization. Each check mark corresponds to the
aspect of data being anonymized.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Structural Anonymization ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Textual Anonymization ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
• (RQ1): Is the data private if just one of its two aspects is anonymized?
• (RQ2): Is case 4, the strongest among four cases, sufficient for
anonymizing social media data?
Following the work of [24], we seek to answer these questions
by taking an adversary approach to assay the privacy level of
anonymized social media data. However, existing de-anonymization
attacks require a list of target users. A target user is an individual v
with the known identity in social media network T which will be
mapped to a user in the given anonymized dataset. These techniques
also require background knowledge Bv for each targeted userv be-
fore initiating the attack. These methods require time and effort to
find a proper set of target users and gather their knowledge which
may not be realistic in practice. To address these challenges, we
first introduce a new generation of adversarial attacks specialized
for social media data which does not require collecting information
before initiating the attack. Furthermore, to assess different ways
of the social media dataset anonymization and answer the afore-
mentioned questions, we propose a novel Adversarial Technique
for Heterogeneous Data, namely, Athd which utilizes the latent
relationship between different aspects of data. This new approach
particularly well suits for social media data in which it is concerned
with assessing the strengths of anonymizing different aspects of
data. Our contributions could be summarized as follows:
• We introduce a new generation of adversarial attacks applicable
to social media network data.
• We propose a novel de-anonymization technique Athd to assess
the privacy level of anonymized heterogeneous social media data.
• We implement and evaluate Athd on two real world datasets
to study the strengths of anonymization techniques in context
of heterogeneous social media data. Our results demonstrates
hidden relations between different aspects of the heterogeneous
data make data anonymization techniques inefficient.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the technical preliminaries of protecting
user privacy in social media data, i.e. data anonymization, which is
required for the rest of this discussion. Without loss of generality, in
this paper, we assume that the published social media data consists
of two aspects, namely, structure and textual information. More
formally, wemodel the social network data asD = (V, E,P)where
V = {i |i is a node} is the set of nodes or users, E = {ei, j |i, j ∈ V∧
there is a link from user i to user j} is the set of links between
any two nodes inV (e.g., friend and follower/followee relations),
and P = {Pi |i ∈ V} is the set of all posts (textual information)
associated with users inV . Pi = {pi1, pi2 , ..., pimi } denotes posts by
user i wheremi is the number of posts for user i. Note that links
in social networks could be either directed (e.g., follower/followee
relation in Twitter) or indirected (e.g., friend relation in Facebook).
We focus on directed graphs, although it is straightforward to apply
the settings on undirected graphs as well. In order to preserve users’
privacy, data publisher should anonymize the social media data
D using privacy preservation techniques. Next, we will discuss
techniques deployed to secure structural and textual information.
2.1 Structural Information Anonymization
To anonymize structural information, we first remove users’ person-
ally identifiable information (PII) such as user’s name and ID. Tech-
niques such as k-degree anonymity [20], sparsification, perturba-
tion and switching [16] are used for adding or removing nodes and
links. The aim of k-anonymity methods is to anonymize each node
so that it is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other nodes [32].
Liu et al. proposed to achieve k-degree anonymization [20] through
edge addition/deletion strategies [20]. Sparsification technique ran-
domly removes a set ofp |E | edges (p is the anonymiztion coefficient)
while switching methods switches p |E |2 pairs of edges. Perturba-
tion approach first removes a set of p |E | edges and then add same
amount of edges randomly [16].
2.2 Textual Information Anonymization
In this work, we anonymize the textual information using ϵ-differential
privacy [10] by first converting each user’s post into a numerical
vector using tokenizing and calculating Term Frequency Inverse
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) scores and then adding Laplacian
noise to the text vector. Details are discussed next.
2.2.1 Text Processing. To anonymize user i’s posts, we first re-
move user’s PII such as user ID (including mentioning and retweet-
ing), name and link information from her texts. Then, we follow
a standard process to convert each of user’s posts to a numerical
vector. To do so, we first consider posts by all users in the dataset
and perform some pre-processing including stop word removal.
The unigram model is then deployed to construct the word feature
spaceW. Finally, we use Term Frequency Inverse Document Fre-
quency (TF-IDF) as a feature weight to derive the vector xil for each
post pil of user i. TF-IDF score for each word t is calculated as:
xil (t) = f il (t) ∗ log
M
nt
(1)
where, f il (t) is the number of times word t appeared in the post pil ,
M is the total number of posts in the data and nt is the number of
posts that the word t was used in them. We can represent pil with
the corresponding vector xil . All users’ posts can be then denoted
by the post-word matrix X ∈ RM×|W | where |W| denotes the
size of the word space. Relations between users and posts can be
also represented via a user-post matrix W ∈ RN×M where N is
the number of users and Wi j = 1 if post j was posted by user i
and Wi j = 0 otherwise. Next, we will discuss how we leverage
differential privacy technique to anonymize the textual information.
2.2.2 Differential Privacy. We use differential privacy technique
proposed in [10] to anonymize the textual information. Differential
privacy aims at maximizing privacy of users when a statistical query
is submitted over a database and an answer is retrieved. Formally,
ϵ-differential privacy is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. (ϵ-Differential Privacy [10]).Given an input
datasetH , a query f (H) and a desirable output range, a mechanism
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K(.) with an output range R satisfies ϵ-differential privacy iff,
Pr [K(f (H1) = R ∈ R)]
Pr [K(f (H2) = R ∈ R)] ≤ e
ϵ (2)
for any datasetsH1,H2 that differ in only one row, where ϵ is the
privacy budget.
Larger values of ϵ result in a larger privacy loss as the changes
of the database can be inferred more easily, and, smaller values of
ϵ lead to smaller privacy loss and a higher tolerance of database
to privacy breach. Note that the differential privacy is just a condi-
tion on a mechanism which releases the dataset. The mechanism
which achieves ϵ-differential privacy is called sanitization. Lapla-
cian mechanism is one popular sanitization technique which gives
differential privacy for real valued queries by adding a Laplacian
noise [10]. Assume that f (H) is the real value response to a certain
query f . Then, a random noise Y (H) is generated from Laplacian
distribution and added to f (H) as:
K (f (H)) = f (H) + Y (H) (3)
The Laplacian distribution has zero mean and a scale parameter
∆(f )/ϵ where ∆(f ) is the sensitivity of f and defined as the maxi-
mum variation of the query function between datasets differing in
at most one record:
∆(f ) = max∥ f (H1) − f (H2)∥1 (4)
The density function of the Laplacian noise will be computed as:
p(x) = ϵ2∆(f )e
− |x |ϵ∆(f ) (5)
Note that higher sensitivity ∆(f ) of the query function f with
fixed ϵ , implies more Laplacian noise added to f (H).
2.2.3 Anonymizing Textual Information with Differential Privacy.
In order to anonymize the post-word matrix X in a way that ϵ-
differential privacy is preserved, we need to apply the discussed
mechanism K(.) on the original matrix X and transform it into a
new one X ′ = K(X ). Instead of transforming the entire matrix X at
once, we can transform each individual row of the matrix by adding
a Laplacian noise to Xi to create a new row X′i . Considering the
identity query function fI (·) where f (D) = D, the sensitivity of
fI (·) can be defined as follows:
∆(fI ) = max∥Xi − Xj ∥1 (6)
whereXi andXj are any two random row vectors fromX. Following
the equation 3, a Laplacian noise will be added to each vector Xi :
K(fI (Xi )) = Xi +
[
Yi1, ...Yi |W |
]
, i = 1, ...,n (7)
Similarly, Yi j ’s are drawn i.i.d. from Laplacian distribution with
zero mean and ∆(fI )/ϵ scale parameter. After anonymizing the
textual information, the anonymized post-word X and user-post
W matrices will be published. The information regrading the word
feature spaceW will be released by the data publisher as well.
3 SOCIAL MEDIA ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
De-anonymization techniques have been proposed in the literature
as a counterpart to data anonymization research direction [11, 18,
26, 28, 35]. De-anonymizationworks further help improve anonymiza-
tion techniques and reduce privacy breach by probing the potential
drawbacks of anonymization techniques. Figure 1(a) depicts how
these de-anonymization approaches work. Theseworks assume that
the adversary has been given a list of target users to de-anonymize
requiring adversarial to collect background knowledge about target
users before initiating the attack [1].
(a) Traditional de-anonymization.
(b) Proposed social media adversarial attack
Figure 1: Traditional de-anonymization vs. proposed social
media adversarial attack.
Narayanan et.al. [24] discuss different ways of collecting back-
ground knowledge such as crawling data via social media networks
API. Since these methods require time and effort to gather knowl-
edge, it may not be realistic in practice for two reasons: (1) the
number of target users can be very large, thinking about the num-
ber of users in Twitter; and (2) most of the online social media
APIs have rate limits on the number of request a user can make
through their APIs in a specific time window. Also, these APIs can
only provide a random small portion of available data for each
search query. This makes it infeasible to collect the background
information for a significant number of users in T in order to find
the one-to-one mapping between users in D and T . Therefore, the
above target-user-based approach cannot be applied to social media
users when no list of target user is given.
To address these shortcomings, we introduce a new generation
of adversarial attacks (Figure 1(b)) specialized for social media
network data. This approach does not require the attacker to gather
background knowledge B before starting the attack. In fact, users
registered in social media which are available via online APIs are
the adversaries’ only source of information. The adversary can send
queries to these APIs, anytime during the adversarial process. It is
formally defined bellow:
Definition 3.1. (Social Media Adversarial Attack). Given an
anonymized social media network datasetD, the aim of adversarial
attack is to find a one-to-one mapping between each user u in D
and a real identity in targeted online social media network T .
Next, we will accordingly discuss the details of our proposed de-
anonymization approach, Athd, which does not require collecting
target users and their background information and is proposed to
further evaluate heterogeneous social media anonymization.
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4 ADVERSARIAL TECHNIQUE FOR
HETEROGENEOUS DATA
Our proposed de-anonymization technique, adversarial technique
for heterogeneous data (Athd), uses different aspects of data, i.e.,
graph structure and users’ textual information to identify the real
identity of users in the anonymized dataset D = (V, E,X,W,W).
We posit that this attack could be applied on various aspects of data
and is not limited to only two data aspects or structural and textual
information.
The main idea behind de-anonymization is to find the most sim-
ilar user in social media T to the user u in the anonymized dataset.
Here, we follow the same approach as the existing works, mean-
while our goal is to design a new framework which exploits the
hidden relations between different aspects of the data, to eventually
map the users to their real profile in T .
Our proposed de-anonymization consists of three main steps.
Given the anonymized datasetD, we first extract themost revealing
information for u. Second, we search those information in search
engine of the targeted social media T . This search returns a list
of people whose posts include the inquired query. We save all the
returned candidates as a candidate set. Third, we identify the profile
from the candidate set most similar to the user u . The details of
each of three steps are discussed next.
4.1 Step 1: Extracting the Most Revealing
Information
The first step includes extracting the most revealing information
for user u via social media API. In this work, we rather use textual
information since it is not straightforward to look up information
related to links. We are thus interested in extracting the most re-
vealing textual information of user u. We assign a score sl to each
post l of u, {l ∈ {1, ...,M}|Wul = 1} to measure how unique each
post l is. Each post l has been vectorized using tf-idf approach and
is represented in l-th row of the post-word matrix X. Given the
vector representation Xl of post l , the score sl is calculated as,
sl =
∑W
t=1 Xl (t)
|W| (8)
The higher this score is, the more unique and thus the more reveal-
ing post l would be. Based on this, we rank user u’s posts and select
the top-k posts as the most revealing information.
4.2 Step 2: Finding a Set of Candidates
The goal of this step is to find a set of candidates for each user u,
given the top-k most revealing posts. To do so, for each nominated
post l from step 1, we select set of words S whose tf-idf scores are
greater than the average of the tf-idf scores for the words in the post
l , Sl = {t |Xl (t) > sl}. This approach helps to not to select useless
words which have non-zero tf-idf values only due to data distortion
during the anonymization process. Therefore, thewordswith higher
chances of being posted in a real text are selected. This step results
in a set of queries Qu = {q(1)u ,q(2)u , ...,q(k)u }. We construct the query
q
(i)
u from set Si , i ∈ {1, ...,k} as q(i)u = {word ∈ Si }. Each of
q
(i)
u ∈ Qu is queried through the T ’s search engine. Result includes
a set of users who have published posts including keywords in q(i)u .
Integrating results from all queries in Qu, we have a set of can-
didate users for user u which is denoted by C = {c1, c2, ..., c |C |}.
Combining steps 1 and 2, we first find posts which are the most
revealing for user u and then for each selected post we select the
words that are more likely to be used by the same user. The result
will be a set of candidates for u.
4.3 Step 3: Matching-Up Candidates to Target
In the last step, we find the most similar candidate to user u. We
shall define a metric which measures the similarity between each
user u and ith candidate ci ∈ C. Previous works [18, 19, 24, 25, 28]
have solely leveraged the structural properties to find the similarity
between a target user v and users in an anonymized dataset. How-
ever, given the properly anonymized network, the attacker is not
be able to accurately find the similarity between users by just in-
corporating structural properties. We use other aspects of the data
(even if they are anonymized) along with structural properties to
reveal interesting information that could be leveraged for inferring
the similarity. Location, textual and profile information are good
examples of such social media data aspects. We consider textual
information as the second aspect of the data. We stress that out
proposed approach is not limited to textual and structural informa-
tion and could be generalized to any data type. We also assume that
the adversary is not aware of details of deployed anonymization
techniques. Next, we define two sets of features to calculate the
similarity between u and her i-th candidate ci .
4.3.1 Structural Features. It has been also shown that users
can be uniquely identified using their neighbors degree distribu-
tions [15]. Following previous works [30], we thus leverage degree
distribitons ofu’s neighborsN(u) (i.e. all followers and followees of
u) in order to represent her structural features. Note that properties
such as betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality cannot
be considered as u’s structural features since it requires having
access to the complete network of users in T which is not feasible
in practice. We quantify degree distributions by categorizing them
into b bins with size of δ in a way that each bin contains the number
of neighbors that have the degree in assigned range of that bin. For
directed graphs, neighbors of each user can be divided into two
groups of follower and followee and final feature set is computed
by concatenating result of each group.
4.3.2 Textual Features. Remind that for user u, the attacker is
given a set ofmu textual vectors as well as word space featuresW.
For each candidate ci , we collect a set of θ recent posts by sending
requests to the T API. The collected posts are then concatenated in
one unified document. Next, ci ’s PII will be removed from the doc-
ument and the corresponding text vector is then created given the
word spaceW following the similar approach of the Section 2.2.1.
Textual features for users u and ci are thus represented by a set
mu = {t1, t2, ...tmu } and a textual vector tci , respectively.
4.3.3 Calculating Users Similarity. Given two groups of struc-
tural and textual features, similarity between u and ci is computed
as the linear combination of their textual and structural similarities,
Sim (u, ci ) = αSimstruct (u, ci ) + (1 − α)Simtext (u, ci ) (9)
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where α controls the contribution of structural similarity. We fur-
ther define Simstruct (u, ci ) as the cosine similarity between the
two structural vectors computed as Simstruct (u, ci ) = cos
(
su , sci
)
.
Textual similarity between u and ci is also computed as the average
of cosine similarity between ∀tj ∈mu and tci ,
Simtext (u, ci ) =
∑ |mu |
j=1 cos
(
tj , tci
)
mu
(10)
4.3.4 Improving Similarity Measure. Merely checking the struc-
tural and textual similarity between the two users’ features may
lead to biased and not accurate results. Moreover, the attacker needs
a more powerful similarity metric which could reduce the effect
of anonymization. To handle this issue, we follow a fundamental
well-defined problem in the field of image processing [8], image
denoising. Non-local mean filters are a traditional way to remove
noise from image data [8]. This approach replaces a pixel’s value
with the weighted average of all other pixels around it. The amount
of weighting for neighboring pixels is based on the degree of sim-
ilarity between a small patch centered on that pixel and a small
patch centered on the pixel being denoised [8]. Inspired by the idea
behind non-local mean filters [8], we use the feature values of other
users similar to user u in order to reduce effect of anonymization.
To apply this idea, we first need to find similar users to u– here
is where the concept of homophily comes in handy. Homophily is
one of the most important social correlation theories which is also
observed in social media and explains the tendency of individuals
to associate and create relationship with similar ones [9, 21].
Following the similar idea to non-local means filtering, we lever-
age homophily and consider user u’s neighbor set N(u) as set of
similar users to her. Utilizing homophily also helps in capturing
the hidden relations between different aspects of the data. We thus
calculate the similarity between N(u) and neighbors set N(ci ) for
candidate ci . We first quantify the degree distributions for all users
in both neighbors set N(u) and N(ci ) as discussed earlier in Sec-
tion 4.3.1. The structural similarity of neighbors are then calculated
based on the cosine similarity between sN(u) and sN(ci ).
Following the procedure introduced in Section 4.3.2, we collect
and concatenate θ recent posts for all neighbors in N(ci ). Textual
similarity between N(u) and N(ci ) is then computed by taking
average over the cosine similarities between textual vector of each
user in N(u) and the textual vector of tN(ci ). The total similarity
between neighbors will be then calculated as follows,
Sim (N(u),N(ci )) = αSimstruct (N(u),N(ci ))
+(1 − α)Simtext (N(u),N(ci )) (11)
This metric quantifies the fitness of N(u) and N(ci ) as the simi-
larity scores of their structural and textual properties. It reduces
the effect of data anonymization and also aligns well with the as-
sumption that if u and ci correspond to the same identity, their
neighborsN(u) andN(ci ) should also match [11]. Finally, the total
similarity between u and ci can be computed as the combination of
their individual similarity and the fitness of their neighbors:
Simtotal (u, ci ) = βSim (u, ci ) + (1 − β)Sim (N(u),N(ci )) (12)
We empirically find that random selection of ci ’s neighbors with
the size λ works well in our problem and we are not required to
collect all neighbors information from T ’s API. This will make the
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Technique for Heterogeneous Data
Input: user u, Anonymized Data D= {V , E, W, X,W}, k , λ, θ , h,
α , β
Output: Top-h mapped accounts in targeted social network T
1: Initialize the candidate set C = ϕ.
2: for each anonymized text vector of post l for u do
3: Calculate score sl according to Eq.8.
4: end for
5: Select top-k posts with the highest score sl as themost revealing
information.
6: for For each text vector l in top-d posts do
7: Select words with tf-idf scores Xl (t) > sl to create search
query q(l )u .
8: Search query q(l )u in T search engine and add results to C.
9: end for
10: for each candidate ci in C do
11: Calculate similarity between u and ci according to Eq.12.
12: end for
13: Return the top-h candidates with maximum similarity
de-anonymization approach more efficient. Note that many noise
removal approaches have been designed for specific kinds of noise
(e.g., Guassian noise) which could be used to remove the noise
from the data and particularly the vector of textual information.
However, using certain noise removal approaches may not always
have positive effects. In fact, it can lead to a wrong estimation
of users’ properties when the attacker does not have any prior
knowledge of the deployed anonymized technique.
The proposed Athd approach is shown in Algorithm 1. The
input to the algorithm is the anonymized dataset and the output is
the top-h mapped profile accounts in T . Lines 2–5, correspond to
the first step of Athd. The set of candidate set (step 2) is then found
through lines 6–9. The similarity between u and each of the selected
candidates is calculated in lines 10–12. Finally, top-h candidates with
the maximum similarity to u will be returned. This re-identification
procedure is then run over all users in the anonymized dataset. Note
Athd is independent of deployed anonymization techniques either
for the textual or structural information. In the next section we will
discuss how our proposed de-anonymization could be generalized
to the social media data with any type of components.
4.4 Generalizability of Athd
Our framework can be generalized through abstraction to different
social media data, assuming that our anonymized data consists
of two different aspects, A1 and A2 and the attacker is willing to
initiate an attack by mapping u to a real profile in the targeted social
media T . As discussed before, the first step is to extract the most
revealing information fromA1 for useru by using the same concept
as tf-idf scores. The second step includes selecting a set of candidate
profiles for u by searching for the extracted information from the
previous step through T ’s search engine. Finally, the similarity
between u and her candidates are calculated using the combination
of features of existing data components, A1 and A2. Features of
the most similar users to u (e.g., neighbors) are also incorporated as
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well to reduce the anonymization effect while capturing the hidden
relation between different aspects of the data.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we seek to answer the introduced research ques-
tions, but we first need to evaluate the efficiency of proposed ad-
versarial technique Athd. We begin this section by introducing the
dataset and anonymization techniques we used. Then, we compare
the results of Athd against the state-of-the-art de-anonymization
benchmarks to evaluate its effectiveness. Next, we use Athd to
assess the anonymization power of each of the four cases to answer
the research questions:
• (RQ1): Is the data private if just one of its two aspects is anonymized?
• (RQ2): Is case 4, the strongest among four cases, sufficient for
anonymizing social media data?
5.1 Datasets
We use two different datasets from two large social media websites,
Twitter and Foursquare. Twitter is a prevalent and well-known
microblogging social media allows millions of active users inter-
acting with each other via short posts, called tweet. Foursquare is
a location based social media in which users share their location
with friends. Users can also leave tips about different places. We
collect the Twitter dataset using Twitter API using the snowball
sampling technique as follows. We begin with a random initial seed
of users and for each user u in the seed, we obtain a random subset
of size 100 of her posted tweets as well as a subset of size 500 of her
follower/followee information. We repeat the same process for each
u’s followers/followees. This way we build our final dataset which
consists of the users in the initial seed and their 2-hops connections.
We follow the same procedure to collect the data from Foursquare
API by considering a random initial seed of users. We collect each
user friends as well as her tips on different locations. We build the
final dataset by repeating this process for 2-hops connections. Note
that in both datasets, we only keep the information of users who
have posted at least one tweet or tip.
Next, we will apply various anonymization techniques on the
obtained dataset– this is described in the next section. Also, we
utilize the Twitter’s advanced search engine1 and Foursquare search
2 during the de-anonymization process for Twitter and Foursquare
data, respectively. It would be also worthwhile to add that we
already have the ground truth for the re-identification, since the
real profiles of the crawled users are known to us beforehand. Table
2 summarizes the statistics of our datasets.
5.2 Anonymization Approaches
We use different anonymization techniques to evaluate the intro-
duced different anonymization cases in Table1. Following previous
work [11], we choose different algorithms for structural information
anonymization as follows:
• Naive Anonymization. This approach only masks users’ iden-
tifiers (PII), and does not change the graph structure. This is
the simplest approach and thus we would expect the highest
vulnerability and hence best de-anonymization result.
1https://twitter.com/search-advanced?lang=en
2https://foursquare.com/explore?
Table 2: Statistics of the crawled datasets.
(a) Twitter
# of Users # of Edges Avg. Clustering Coefficient
6,789 244,480 0.219
Density # of Tweets # of Unigrams
0.005 478,129 208,483
(b) Foursquare
# of Users # of Edges Avg. Clustering Coefficient
22,332 229,234 0.295
Density # of Tips # of Unigrams
0.0005 124,744 103,264
• Sparsification. This work randomly eliminatesp |E | edgeswhere
p is the anonymiztion coefficient.
• k-deg(add) [20]. This anonymization method ensures that k-
degree anonymity is preserved by only adding edges.
• k-degree(add & del) [20]. This method ensures that k-degree
anonymity is preserved by performing simultaneous add/removal
of the edges.
• Switching. This method selects two random edges (i1, j1) and
(i2, j2) from the original graph such that {(i1, j2) < E ∧ (i2, j1) <
E}. Then, it switches pairs of edges, i.e. remove edges (i1, j1) and
(i2, j2) and add new edges (i1, j2) and (i2, j1) instead. This step is
repeated p |E |2 timeswhich results inp |E | edge removals/additions.• Perturbation. Thismethod is also known as unintended anonymzi-
ation and has two main steps. It first removes p |E | edges in a
same way as sparsification method does. Then, it adds random
false edges until the number of edges in the anonymized graph
is the same as the original one.
Furthermore, the Textual information is anonymized using the
techniques discussed earlier in Section 2.2 as follows:
• NaiveAnonymization. This approach first removes users’ iden-
tifiers and links from the tweets and then vectorize it.
• DiffPrivacy. Thismethod takes the output of the naive anonymiza-
tion technique and then ensures differential privacy by adding
Laplacian noise to the generated text vector.
5.3 Results and Discussion
5.3.1 Experimental Settings. We evaluate de-anonymization ap-
proaches by a metric called success rate X = ncN , where nc is the
total number of users that have been successfully re-identified and
N is the total number of users in the anonymized dataset![24].
Larger values of this measure correspond to higher privacy breach.
Following the previous works [11, 28], we set k = 10 for k-
degree anonymity and p = 0.1 for sparsification, purturbation
and switching methods. The ϵ for differential privacy technique
is set as ϵ = 0.01. We also set the parameters of Athd as follows:
{k = 10,α = 0.5, β = 0.7, λ = 20,θ = 50,b = 7,δ = 50}. The
values of δ and b for quantifying degree distributions are chosen
such that it can accommodate higher degrees variation. Empirical
results showed that the choice of δ and b does not have a huge
impact on the final results. We also set the number of returned
profiles as h = 1. Clearly, increasing the value of h will increase the
de-anonymization success rate. To answer the research questions,
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(a) Twitter
Athd-Improved Athd-Simple ADA Narayanan et. al.
Naive Diff Privacy Naive Diff Privacy Naive Diff Privacy Naive Diff Privacy
Naive 0.9435 (1) 0.8020 (2) 0.8200 (1) 0.6951 (2) 0.6729 (1) 0.5513 (2) 0.5073 (1) 0.4100 (2)
Sparsification 0.8087 (3) 0.6998 (4) 0.7327 (3) 0.6213 (4) 0.6099(3) 0.5114 (4) 0.4316 (3) 0.3437 (4)
k-deg(add) 0.7894 (3) 0.6814 (4) 0.6900 (3) 0.6125 (4) 0.5898 (3) 0.4982 (4) 0.3979 (3) 0.3139 (4)
k-deg(add & del) 0.7580 (3) 0.6533 (4) 0.6891 (3) 0.5821 (4) 0.5800 (3) 0.4727 (4) 0.3815 (3) 0.2997 (4)
Switching 0.6911 (3) 0.5812 (4) 0.6013 (3) 0.5186 (4) 0.4971 (3) 0.4014 (4) 0.3520 (3) 0.2618 (4)
Perturbation 0.6500 (3) 0.5685 (4) 0.5367 (3) 0.4249 (4) 0.4322 (3) 0.3618 (4) 0.2987 (3) 0.2018 (4)
(b) Foursquare
Athd-Improved Athd-Simple ADA Narayanan et. al.
Naive Diff Privacy Naive Diff Privacy Naive Diff Privacy Naive Diff Privacy
Naive 0.8004 (1) 0.6799 (2) 0.7107 (1) 0.5989 (2) 0.5699 (1) 0.4821 (2) 0.4400 (1) 0.3754 (2)
Sparsification 0.7238 (3) 0.6299 (4) 0.6400 (3) 0.5499 (4) 0.5118(3) 0.4532 (4) 0.3968 (3) 0.3028 (4)
k-deg(add) 0.6947 (3) 0.5999 (4) 0.6112 (3) 0.5288 (4) 0.5138 (3) 0.4157 (4) 0.3487 (3) 0.2748 (4)
k-deg(add & del) 0.6612 (3) 0.5739 (4) 0.5918 (3) 0.4989 (4) 0.4867 (3) 0.3947 (4) 0.3025 (3) 0.2639 (4)
Switching 0.6134 (3) 0.5431 (4) 0.5517 (3) 0.4614 (4) 0.4300 (3) 0.3521 (4) 0.2987 (3) 0.2120 (4)
Perturbation 0.5642 (3) 0.4930 (4) 0.4518 (3) 0.3670 (4) 0.3402 (3) 0.2836 (4) 0.2300 (3) 0.1876 (4)
Table 3: Comparison of the de-anonymization success rates for various anonymization techniques. Higher values imply higher
privacy breach. Numbers in parentheses demonstrate the corresponding case number in Table 1.
we make 12 copies of the original data and sanitize each copy with
a different combination of structural and textual anonymization
techniques discussed earlier. For evaluation, we define two different
variants of our proposed approach, Athd, as follows:
• Athd-Simple: This uses Eq.9 and Eq.10 to calculate similarity.
• Athd-Improved: This variant uses Eq.12 to improve similarity
measure by incorporating features from neighbors to reduce the
anonymization effect.
5.3.2 Perfomrnace Comparison. To evaluate the effectiveness
of Athd, we benchmark its two variants, Athd-Simple and Athd-
Improved, against the following two baselines.
• Narayanan et. al. [24]: It computes the similarity between an
unmapped user u and a candidate ci , by using the number of
neighbors of u that have been mapped to neighbors of ci .
• ADA [18]: This method considers a combination of structural,
relative distance and inheritance similarity. We only use degree
centrality for measuring structural similarity as we do not have
access to the global structure of ci in T .
In general, these baselines are seed-based approaches, mean-
ing that they map a known target user v in T to a user in the
anonymized data by utilizing a small set of initially mapped seed
users and then propagating the mappings through the whole data.
These works also need a previously collected background knowl-
edge B. We need to use same settings to make a fair comparison
between the baselines and our proposed framework. To do so, we
first make an initial seed set of the size ν = 20, by mapping a set
of random users in the anonymized dataset to their real identities
for each of Twitter and Foursquare data. Then, we repeat the same
3-step procedure as in the Athd for the baselines, except that we
the similarity metric in the last step is replaced with those of the
baselines. Performance comparison results for both datasets are
demonstrated in Table 3 with the following observations:
• Narayanan et. al. is the least effective de-anonymization on both
datasets. The reason is because its utilized similarity metric re-
lies on the set of previously mapped neighbors and ignores the
available structural and textual information provided in the data.
• ADA approach is more powerful than Narayanan et. al. since it
incorporates structural properties of the data.
• Anonymized data is more vulnerable to Athd-Simple compared
to ADA and Narayanan et. al. This is because both structural
and textual information are incorporated in the similarity metric
used in Athd-Simple. This confirms that integrating different
components of data plays an important role in de-anonymization
for heterogeneous social media data.
• Athd-Improved technique achieves the best results for both Twit-
ter and Foursquare datasets. This demonstrates the effectiveness
of utilizing homophily and the features of neighbors for more
effective de-anonymization.
To recap, the above observations confirm the efficiency of our
proposed approach Athd.
5.3.3 Assessing Effectiveness of Anonymization. Having discussed
the efficiency of the proposed Athd de-anonymization approach,
we now seek the answer to the last two questions. The performance
results w.r.t. the four anonymization cases are demonstrated in
Table 3. The numbers in parentheses demonstrate the correspond-
ing case number defined earlier in the introduction. We make the
following observations for both datasets:
• Publishing the data with no anonymization for either aspect
(i.e., case 1) resulted in a large information breach in both Athd-
Simple and Athd-Improved approaches which suggests the least
amount of protection as expected.
• In general, anonymizing either aspect of the data (i.e., cases 2
and 3) protects users privacy more than case 1.
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• Case 4 is the strongest protection among the four cases. Accord-
ingly, the answer to the second question is no.
• Although case 4 provides the strongest protection,Athd-Improved
was able to re-identify at least 56% of the users in the anonymized
dataset, which is a significant number in the field of privacy. This
shows that case 4 is far from sufficient for data anonymization.
• Sparsification is the most vulnerable anonymization approach
against both Athd-Simple and Athd-Improved techniques as it
makes the least amount of changes to the link information.
• Although the switching and perturbation methods both add and
deletes the same number of edges, switching is more vulnerable
to the de-anonymization since it preserves the node degrees.
• Despite the fact that k-degree anonymity based approaches guar-
antee the user re-identification probability to be at most 1k , but
they fail because of using extra textual information.
According to these observations, the answers to the introduced
research questions are no. These results further indicate that despite
anonymization of all aspects of data is essential, but it is not suffi-
cient to anonymize each aspect independently from others. This is
because an adversary could easily breach privacy no matter what
anonymization algorithm has been used. Consequently, serious
privacy breach could happen when the published data is heteroge-
neous. This necessitates taking into account the latent relations in
different portions of the social media data for anonymization.
6 RELATEDWORK
Social Network Anonymization. Social networks contain pri-
vate profile information and sensitive social relationships which
provide opportunities for researchers to study and understand indi-
viduals at unprecedented scales [3, 5, 12, 14]. However, this infor-
mation may leak users’ privacy [2]. Anonymization methods serve
as an important role to maintain data utility as well as protecting
privacy [34]. Existing social network anonymization methods can
be categorized mainly into three categories: k-anonymity, edge ran-
domization, clustering-based generalization and differential privacy.
The aim of k-anonymity methods is to anonymize each node so
that it is indistinguishable from at least k−1 other nodes [32]. Liu et
al. proposed to achieve k-degree anonymization [20] through edge
addition/deletion strategies [20]. Zhou et al. further considered the
assumption that the adversary knows subgraph constructed by
the immediate neighbors of a target node, and aims to achieve k-
neighborhood anonymity [37]. Edge randomization algorithms for
social networks usually utilize edge-based randomization strategies
to anonymize data, such as random adding/deleting and random
switching [36]. Clustering-based anonymization methods group
nodes and edges, and only reveal the density and size so that individ-
ual attributes are protected [33]. Another work seeks to generate an
anonymized graph which guarantees differential privacy [29]. So-
cialNetworkDe-anonymization.De-anonymization approaches
on social networks aim to re-identify the anonymous user data by
using previously collected background information. Existing de-
anonymization methods can be categorized into i) seed-based and
ii) seed-free, according to whether pre-annotated seed users exist
or not. Seed-based de-anonymization attack on social network was
proposed to use only structural information and propagates node
mappings based on seed user pairs [24]. Later, Narayanan et al.
[22] employed a simplified attack using less heuristics rules for link
prediction problem. Nilizadeh et al. further proposed a community-
enhanced de-anonymization scheme, which first de-anonymizes
data in community-level and then de-anonymizes the users within
the communities [25]. Yartseva et al. proposed a percolation-based
de-anonymization method using neighborhood overlap informa-
tion [35]. Seed-free approaches assume there is no seed users avail-
able. Pedarsani et al. presented a Bayesian model to iteratively per-
form a maximum weighted bipartite graph matching starting from
the nodes with the highest degree [26]. Moreover, Ji et al. proposed
to use optimization based methods to minimize the edge difference
between anonymized network and background information [17].
Recently, another group of works have focused on exploiting ad-
ditional sources of information such as profile information [11]
and users attributes [28] for social graph de-anonymization. Fu et
al. proposed to use structural and descriptive information to de-
anonymize users without seed nodes [11]. A thorough survey
on graph data anonymization and de-anonymization is presented
in [19]. Note that de-anonymization methods are similar to those
of user identity linkage across social network when only network
information is available [31]. In addition to the different goals of
these two research direction, the main difference is that the given
graph structured is not anonymized in case of user identity linkage
problem. This makes the de-anonymization much more challeng-
ing.There are two main differences between our work and the above
works. First, we introduce a new adversarial attack specialized for
social media data and second, we assess the efficiency of existing
anonymization techniques for heterogeneous social media data.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we study a new problem of user data privacy for
social media via an adversarial approach. Our work differs from
the existing works due to unique properties of social media data:
a social media site has an inordinate number of users and the site
only allows for a limited number of data queries. Since anonymiza-
tion takes time and requires dedicated efforts, anonymization ef-
ficiency should be maximized. Thus, we evaluate the strengths of
anonymization techniques in the context of social media data and
verify if it is sufficient. We propose Athd, a novel adversarial tech-
nique by exploiting heterogeneous characteristics of social media
data. Our results illustrate that anonymizing even all aspects of
data is not sufficient for protecting user privacy due to hidden re-
lations between different aspects of the heterogeneous data. One
future research direction for our work is to examine how different
combinations of heterogeneous data (e.g., a combination of location
and textual information) are vulnerable to the de-anonymization
attack, though the work reported in this paper is sufficient to show
the need for better anonymization with resource constraints. An-
other potential direction is to improve anonymization techniques
to preserve the privacy of users in social media data by considering
hidden relations between different components of the data due to
the innate heterogeneity of user-generated data.
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